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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHANGING PRIOR RULINGS 
UNDER RULE 54(b) CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED INDEPENDENT OF RULE 60(b)(7) 
Defendant argues that it makes no difference whether 
Judge Young considered the Motion for Relief from Order Denying 
Summary Judgment under Rule 60(b)(7), U. R. Civ, P., as 
originally filed, or under Rule 54(b), U. R. Civ. P. as now 
argued. To the contrary, the two rules set different standards. 
See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988). 
Rule 54(b) means "[a]ny judge is free to change his or 
her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered . . . .ff Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
761 P.2d at 45. However, "the xlaw of the case7 doctrine is 
employed to avoid delay and to prevent injustice" such as expense 
and delay resulting from repetitive consideration of the same 
issues in a single case. Id. "Rule 54(b) allows courts to 
readjust prior rulings in complex cases as subsequent 
developments in the case might suggest . . . . The xlaw of the 
case doctrine' nonetheless . . . create[s] a kind of presumption 
that the court's prior rulings, even if not certified as final 
under Rule 54(b), were correct and should stand." Id., pp. 44-
45, n. 5. 
Judge Wilkinson denied summary judgment on the implied-
in-fact contract issue. Defendant asked Judge Wilkinson to 
change his mind on in its first motion to reconsider in 1991. He 
didn't. Defendant addressed the same issue in 1992 when it asked 
Judge Noel to rule, in limine, that plaintiff's evidence of 
implied-in-fact contract terms of employment was not relevant or 
admissible. On an identical motion in limine in the companion 
case of Power v. Riverview Financial (a/k/a Mrs. Fields Cookies) 
Judge Noel ruled that the evidence of the implied-in-fact 
contract was both substantial and relevant. Judge Noel scheduled 
the cases for trial on the basis of that evidence. 
Defendant sought a fourth bite at the apple in 1993 
when it asked Judge Young to reconsider Judge Wilkinson's denial 
of summary judgment on the implied contract of employment issue. 
The Motion to Reconsider (styled as "Defendant's Motion for 
Relief from Order", R. at 657-59) offered no new evidence. This 
directly violated the law of case doctrine. "The law of the case 
doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the case of summary 
judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case in a 
different light, such as when no new material evidence is 
introduced." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 
P.2d at 45. 
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Judge Young's error in not requiring defendant to meet the high 
standard of Rule 60(b) was extremely harmful. It required 
plaintiff to take a costly and time consuming appellate detour 
enroute to realization of his constitutional right to jury trial. 
The summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial on the merits, as originally decided. 
POINT II 
NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OP PACT 
REMAIN FOR JURY TRIAL 
In its response, defendant has summarized its best 
evidence to refute an implied-in-fact employment contract. There 
is nothing new here. Defendant does not contest the plaintiff's 
substantial evidence which rebuts the at-will presumption. A 
clearer question of fact for the jury is hard to imagine. The 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the jury as the 
appropriate arbiter of such disputes. Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & 
Davis Utah, Inc.. 777 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1989); Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991); and 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). 
Defendant wants to draw this Court into an 
inappropriate fact-finding function, focusing solely on its 
evidence and ignoring plaintiff's support. The Court should not 
be seduced into this role. The law of at-will and implied-in-
fact contracts has been stated repeatedly and clearly in 
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Let the jury decide whether, as defense 
counsel claims, Mrs. Fields Cookies 
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 repeatedly and in the simplest of terms'' 
reserved the at-will presumption. 
Let the jury decide if Mrs. Fields Cooki es' 
reservation of at-will ("although we 
generally will follow a disciplinary process 
because we are at-will, The Company reserves 
the right to terminate a team, member 
immediately") is "unequivocal" and "clear," 
Let t:;e jury decide if ai 1 at will reservation 
buried 272 pages inside a 304 page manual is 
"clear and conspicuous" in the face of 
numerous earlier calls for team spirit, 
promises of advancement: through initiative, 
and pledges ^f f;^r t-v-o^tment and rational 
procedures. 
\jk<~. x. J. ciA.pi eo.-- £,i -Jiiiises ot 
specific discipline standards and procedures, 
made both in person and in a colored video 
presentation published company-wide, manifest 
an intent of the parties for something other 
than at-will. (Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf 
818 P 2d at .1 00] ) 
Let the jury decide if Mrs. Fields Cookies7 
frequent, specific expressions of loyalty and 
concern for employees created an "atmosphere" 
in which employees reasonably expected 
something other than at-will as a standard by 
which they would be treated. Thurston v. Box 
Elder County, 83 5 P,2d 165 {Utah 199 2) . 
Let the jury decide if the 1 hour and 15 
minute video presentation of Mrs. Fields 
Cookies' President and Chairman of the Board, 
with its numerous factual scenarios stating 
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explicitly what was fair in the way of 
employee treatment, was "sufficiently 
definite to operate as a contract provision." 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
Let the jury decide what it means when 
Mrs. Fields Cookies qualified its vaunted 
employee handbook ("we do not expect this 
handbook to answer all of your questions. 
Your supervisor will be your major source of 
information." R. at 789) and then 
plaintiff's supervisors and superiors 
represented that termination would only occur 
for cause and after following disciplinary 
processes. 
Let the jury decide what was objectively 
intended and understood when Mrs. Fields 
Cookies7 Chairman of the Board represented in 
living color that "the values of the company 
are without question the most important thing 
. . . . One of the things you are going to 
find in terms of the values here, is that 
they're absolutes. . . . The success of 
Mrs. Fields has really been a function of the 
values of the company. . . . This is like 
coming home, this is like building a 
relationship [which you need to understand] 
early on in your career with Mrs. Fields . . 
Your career path with Mrs. Fields 
. . . more than anything else depends on your 
commitment to this value system. . . . The 
values of the company that we are going to 
elaborate this morning have not changed from 
the day that [Debbie Fields] opened the store 
in August of 1977. . . . What has changed 
are almost every procedure in the company." 
And those comments were followed up by the 
President, Debbie Fields, who said 
"commitment to our people: that's number one. 
. . . Everything that you do is absolutely 
grounded to these values that you will soon 
learn about. . . . And I'm real clear. . . 
. you also need to know that you can hold me 
100% accountable . . . .' R. at 499-503. 
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terminable cni': :;:: :ause after specific standards of fairness 
and procedures for discipline are observed. Defendant doesn't 
contest that information. Rather, it hangs it hat on inclusion 
of the term "at-will" in the initial application form, a Policies 
and Procedures Manual, and an Employee Handbook. Defendant does 
not contest that written terms can be overridden by verbal 
representations, by conduct of parties, or by subsequent 
modifications. Defendant claims that the at-will language is 
clear and conspicuous, although it is buried deep within the 
voluminous manuals and appears in text which is equivocal and 
ambiguous. 
The only way for this Court to sustain summary judgment 
under these circumstances is to rule, as a matter of law, that 
whenever the term "at-will" shows up in employee documents, it 
will always trump contrary representations, other terms of 
employment, and inconsistent courses of dealing. That is not the 
holding of any case either in Utah or from any other jurisdiction 
cited by defendant. Such a holding would be a step backward into 
a darker employment era. It would encourage employers to pander 
for employee loyalty and enhanced performance with no risk that 
their words would ever be taken seriously or that they would be 
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held accountable for the normal contractual consequences which 
strong expressions of obligation create in all other areas of 
commercial endeavor. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 1993• 
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